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UNDER THE SPREADING U.C.C.-
SUBORDINATIONS AND
ARTICLE 9
ROBERT M. ZINMAN*
When William Schnader first stepped before his fellow Commis-
sioners in the grand ballroom of the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in Phil-
adelphia on September 2, 1940 and proposed that a "great uniform
commercial code be prepared,' he undoubtedly had two goals with
respect to what was to become Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.' The first was to clear the confusion created by the topsy-like
growth of chattel security legislation, and the second was to give the
* A.B., Tufts University 1953; LL.B., Harvard Law School 1960; LL.M., New York
University School of Law 1965; member of the New York Bar. The writer wishes to
thank Prof. Daniel G. Collins of the New York University School of Law for his
cooperation in the preparation of the original draft of this article; John J. Creedon,
Associate General Counsel, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and legal associates
for their help and encouragement; and his wife Marion for deferring a significant portion
of her courtship to the Uniform Commercial Code.
1 It was the occasion of the fiftieth annual meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The session was convened at 2:15 P.M. by the
President, William A. Schnader, a Philadelphia lawyer and now Chairman of the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. There was an address of
welcome from Joseph P. Gaffney, Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association, who
said that his Association "throws open to you its heart and its home." Then followed a
speech by Judge William M. Hargest of Harrisburg, the calling of the roll and the
dispensing of the reading of the minutes. And then—the address of the President. It was
not an encouraging talk. Mr. Schnader complained that of the eighty-four acts
promulgated by the Conference prior to 1939, the average number of enactments was
only ten. Besides which, "our splendid commercial acts" were beginning to become
dated. Then he asked: "Could not a great uniform commercial code be prepared, which
would bring the commercial law up to date, and which could become the uniform law of
our fifty-three jurisdictions, by the passage of only fifty-three acts, instead of many
times that number?" Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws & Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Conference 51, 58 (1940). It was
bright and clear in Philadelphia that Labor Day—the temperature reached 84 degrees.
And, as might be expected, there was a new moon in the sky that night. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 3, 1940, p. 35, col. 7.
2 The Uniform Commercial Code will hereafter be referred to as the "Code."
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parties greater freedom of contract, thus making their objectives
easier to achieve. It certainly was not in Mr. Schnader's mind, nor
in the minds of Karl Llewellyn and the other drafters of Article 9, 3 to
make simple transactions difficult. 4 Yet, in a few areas, this has been
the case.
The broad language of the Code's definition of security interest'
may encompass some transactions which the framers never intended to
cover, and for this reason, if these transactions are within the Code's
scope, they are covered only ineffectually. It is possible that in some
of these areas, Article 9 creates the very problems it was intended
to cure. Fortunately, these areas are few and are on the periphery
of the Code where correction can be accomplished without damaging
the fundamental provisions and purposes of the otherwise smoothly-
functioning Article 9. Most of these troublesome problems are in the
somewhat esoteric fields in which institutional lenders like to probe.'
Because the center for these large scale financial activities is New York,
and because of the relatively prosperous nature of the American econo-
my in the 1950's and 1960's, it has only been since the passage of the
Code in New York 7 that institutional lenders have become especially
concerned with these problem areas. 8
 One such area involves subordi-
nation agreements.
a The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws joined forces
with the American Law Institute to draft the Code. These organizations are hereinafter
referred to as the "Sponsoring Organizations." Karl N. Llewellyn, Professor of Law at
Columbia Law School, who was in attendance when Mr. Schnader delivered his famous
address, was named Chief Reporter and Miss Soia Mentschikoff (later to become Mrs.
Llewellyn), then of Harvard Law School, was named the Associate Chief Reporter.
4 Harold F. Birnbaum, one of the original advisors on the Code, representing the
American Law Institute, wrote that the purposes of Article 9 were "(1) to facilitate the
legal perfection of security interests; (2) to leave unaffected any procedures which give
practical protection; and (3) to disregard all distinctions based solely on form and
technicality." Birnbaum, Article 9—A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, 1952
Wis, L. Rev. 348, 353. Mr. Birnbaum's second point is especially commended to the
reader's attention. Other interesting articles discussing the development of the Code
in general and Article 9 in particular include Braucher, The Legislative History of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 798 (1958) ; Braucher, The 1956 Revision
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 3 (1956); Gilmore, The Secured Trans-
actions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 27 (1951); Gilmore,
On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 Yale L.J. 1341 (1948).
5 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) defines "security interest," inter ala i as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
6 Besides subordination agreements, there are some other complex Code problems
that arise in connection with large corporate financing. These problems involve the so-
called "back-stop agreements" with third parties, which in various ways assure that the
borrower will be in a position to repay the debt, assignments of ship charters and even
negative pledge clauses, With respect to the latter category, see Coast Bank v. Minderhout,
61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P,2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
7 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553 (effective Sept. 27, 1964).
S Some of the drafters expressed concern about the fact that there were certain
specialized areas of financing with which they were largely unfamiliar:
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Generally, a subordination agreement provides for the priority
of payment for certain of a debtor's indebtedness (the senior debt)
before payment of his other indebtedness (the junior debt) .9 This
article discusses subordinations in the light of Article 9 and reaches
the conclusion that, while the Code was not intended to cover subordina-
tion agreements, doubt exists in certain areas as to whether it does,
and this doubt should be eliminated by amendment to the Code. In
this connection, the present status of corrective legislation is reviewed.
I. ARE SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS SECURITY INTERESTS?
A. "Subsequent" Subordinations
Certain types of subordination agreements may possibly fit within
the Code's definition of security interest in section 1-201(37). For
want of a better name, we will call these agreements "subsequent"
subordinations because the subordination generally occurs sometime
after the note is issued. The following is an example of such a subor-
dination.
In 1965 the Obscure Electronics Company borrows $100,000 from
The thing that troubles me is a pair of recent conversations in which bank
lawyers from leading firms told me how they puzzle over Benedict v. Ratner
in rarified fields of security. One was the hypothecation of actors' employment
contracts and other intangible rights to inchoate and partly completed films and
any revenues derived in leasing the films. In the other case, the problem was an
•inventory loan on oil in a tank farm, in which the field warehousemen lost
possession when the oil moved from a raw oil tank into the refinery and before
it got back into a processed oil tank. Nov I am not concerned here with Benedict
v. Ratner but my point is that there are fields of security that are totally
outside my experience or the experience of any of those who worked on Article 9
over the years, with the possible exception of Walter Malcolm. Charlie Willard,
another experienced bank lawyer, has always stayed away from Article 9.
Coogan's first brush with the Code was to point out the broad language which
brought in all forms of personality but left general intangibles unprovided for.
1 hesitate to see Article 9 frozen against the possibility of suitable adaptation in
fields unknown to me and perhaps presently unknown to anyone.
Letter from Homer Kripke to Professor Grant Gilmore, October 22, 1954 (during the
reappraisal of the Code which led to the 1956 revision). Mr, Kripke was then and is
now a member of the subcommittee on Article 9 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code, then known as the "Enlarged Editorial Board." Mr. Kripke's
objective was to keep the Code flexible enough to meet changing circumstances and
financial practices. The purpose of the drafters in broadly wording the definition of
"security interest" in § 1-201(37) and the later inclusion of a category of collateral
known as "general intangibles" would seem to be to provide room for development of
the Code in new and different forms of genuine security transactions. Sec U.C.C. § 9-106
and accompanying Comment; 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code 261. However, this broad language permits the argument
that certain financing procedures which were never thought of as security transactions,
in fact create security interests under the Code.
0 See Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70 Yale L.J. 376 (1961). Among the
few other fine articles on the subject of subordinations are Everett, Subordinated Debt-
Nature, and Enforcement, 20 Bus. Law. 953 (1965); and Golin, Debt Subordination
as a Working Tool, 7 N.Y.L.F. 370 (1961).
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its Secretary-Treasurer, Credson, and gives Credson an unsecured
note. In 1967 Obscure develops a new pocket-size laser light and asks
Conservative Insurance Company for a one million dollar loan to
produce it. Obscure meets the earnings requirements of Conserva-
tive's states' insurance laws and Conservative agrees to make the
unsecured loan on condition that Credson subordinate to Conserva-
tive. Credson readily agrees. Conservative makes the loan to Obscure,
and Conservative and Credson enter into a separate agreement under
which Credson agrees that no payment may be made to him by Ob-
scure so long as Obscure's debt to Conservative is outstanding. He fur-
ther assigns to Conservative all his right, title and interest in and to
any payment to which he might otherwise have been entitled.'
It is possible that this subordination may be held to create a
security interest within the meaning of section 1-201(37). That sec-
tion defines security interest as, inter alia, "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation."" Section 9-102 (1) (a) provides that Article 9 is applicable
to any transaction "intended to create a security interest in personal
property." The question is whether the parties intended an interest
in personal property to serve as security for an obligation. Although
this was probably not the parties' intention, a logical argument can
be made that it was.
The definition of "security interest" is the key to Article 9. While
it is true that Article 9 was intended to be flexible, this definition
could, nevertheless, have been more explicitly worded. For example,
what is personal property and to whose interest in personal property
does the section refer?
Personal property is not defined in the Code. However, section
9-102(1) (a) provides that personal property includes "goods, docu-
ments, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or
contract rights." Thus "personal property" would seem to cover every-
thing from tangible chattels 12
 to "miscellaneous types of contractual
rights;"13 in short, anything capable of being owned which is not real
10 This type of subordination is described as a "complete" subordination because
"no payment of principal or interest on the subordinated debt is permitted so long as
the debtor is obligated to the senior creditor." Calligar, supra note 9, at 378. If a subor-
dination "does not become operative" until the happening of some future event such
as the bankruptcy or insolvency of the debtor, the subordination would be "inchoate"
under Mr. Calligar's definition. Id. at 377-78. It should be emphasized that Mr. Calligar's
definitions cut across the distinctions made in this paper; thus the subsequent subordina-
tion may be either inchoate or complete.
11 Unless otherwise specifically stated, all quotations from the Code used herein
are from ALI & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text.
12 See	 § 9-105(1)(f) (definition of "goods").
13 U.C.C. § 9-106, Comment.
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property. This seems consistent with non-Code law." As for whose
interest in personal property is intended, the definition undoubtedly
refers to an interest of the secured party in the property of another.
Any other interpretation would not make apparent sense. 15
Thus, in order for the subordination agreement described above
to be or to create a security interest, the secured party (Conservative)
must have an interest in personal property belonging to Credson which
secures payment of Obscure's debt to Conservative. While it is clear
that no security interest was created against Obscure, since Conserva-
tive and Credson are simply general creditors of Obscure and none
of Obscure's property secures its obligation to Conservative, a different
situation exists between Conservative and Credson. Credson held
Obscure's obligation and had the right to payment as a general creditor.
Now, by agreement with Conservative, this right becomes a form of
security for Obscure's debt to Conservative. 10 It could be argued
forcefully that the right to payment as' a general creditor is not an
interest in personal property in spite of the broad scope generally
given to this term." However, it is certainly possible that a court
would hold that a security interest is created between Conservative
and Credson, just as if Credson had mortgaged his car or assigned
14 See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 39 which defines personal property, in part,
as including:
chattels, money, things in action, and all written instruments themselves, as
distinguished from the rights or interests to which they relate, by which any
right, interest, lien or incumbrance in, to or upon property, or any debt or
financial obligation is created, acknowledged, evidenced, transferred, discharged
or defeated, wholly or in part, and everything, except real property, which
may be the subject of ownership;
Black, Law Dictionary 1301 (4th ed. 1951).
15 While this may seem elementary, it should be realized that it is possible to argue,
under a strict reading of the definition, that a simple guaranty of a loan is a security
interest. The recipient of the guaranty has an interest in personal property, i,e., the
guarantor's promise to pay if the obligor does not, This promise helps to secure the
obligation. Thus there is "an interest in personal property which secures payment or
performance of an obligation." See U.C.C. § 1-201(37). But here the interest belongs
to the secured party. The guarantor has an obligation, not a property right. Surely
the drafters did not intend that one could obtain a security interest in one's own property.
le "CSJubordinations have the practical effect of making the subordinated debt a type
of security for the senior debt, available to the senior creditor upon a distribution of the
assets to the debtor—[obligor]." Calligar, supra note 9, at 378. Calligar goes on to point
out that where payments are permitted on the subordinated debt until the happening of
a specified event (he calls this an "inchoate" subordination) "the 'security' may decrease
or even vanish." But in the case of the subordination under which the subordinating
creditor may not be paid until the senior creditor is paid in full (the "complete" sub-
ordination), "the subordinated debt is 'locked in' and its distributional value in bank-
ruptcy becomes in effect, just as much a security benefiting the senior debt holder as
would, for example, a chattel mortgage in the hands of the foreclosing mortgagee." Ibid.
17
 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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his accounts as security for Obscure's debt to Conservative.' In
Code terms, Conservative would be the "secured party," and Credson
would be the "debtor" since, under the Code, "debtor" is defined to
include the owner of the collateral, or the obligor, or both." In
subordination terms, Obscure is the obligor, Conservative the senior
creditor, and Credson the junior creditor.
B. Ab Initio Subordinations
Unlike subsequent subordinations, there are other types of subor-
dinations which are far from the Code's concept of "security interest."
We will call these "ab initio subordinations" because the obligation
is subordinated from its inception.
For example, assume that Conservative Insurance Company,
on March 1, 1965, loans one million dollars to Obscure Electronics
Company, due February 1, 1985. The loan agreement provides that
Obscure shall not become liable in respect of any funded indebtedness
other than subordinated debt until its debt to Conservative is paid in
full. It defines subordinated debt, inter alia, as debt: (1) with no pay-
ment of principal or interest until February 1, 1985, and (2) which
contains a provision stating that upon any payment or distribution of
18 See Henson, The Problem of Uniformity, 20 Bus. Law. 689 (1965) where, in
referring to an agreement similar to the subsequent subordination, he said: "This kind
of transaction is intended to and does involve a security interest. . . ." Id. at 693. It
would seem, however, that parties like Credson and Conservative have never "intended"
a security interest when executing this type of subordination agreement, but rather think
more in terms of "contractual hierarchy of payments." 1 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts,
Secured Transactions Under the U.C.C. § 5.03(2)(e) (1963).
113 See the definition of "secured party" in § 9-105(1) (i). The definition of "debtor"
found in § 9-105(1)(d) is.somewhat confusing. In the Spring, 1950 Proposed Final Draft
of the Code, "debtor" (then in § 9-105(1)(e)) was defined as the owner of the collateral
whether or not he was the obligor. This obviously would not do. In the Final Text
Edition of November 1951, the definition was changed to two sentences. The first is
unchanged today: "'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or other performance
of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral. . • ."
In other words, the debtor is the obligor even if the obligor doesn't own the collateral-
180 degrees from the 1950 language. However, the second sentence stated that where
the debtor and the owner of the collateral were not the same person, the term "debtor"
would include the owner of the collateral unless the context required otherwise. This
was criticized at the New York Law Revision Commission hearings because it seemed
to conflict with such sections as § 9-112 which speaks of collateral being owned "by a
person who is not the debtor." Although the definition was finally approved by the Law
Revision Commission subject to certain "questions," (see Report of the N.Y. State
Law Rev, Comm. App. IV at 466 (1956)), the criticism led to an amendment to the
second sentence in the 1956 revision to provide that either the obligor or the owner
of the collateral or both may be the "debtor" depending on the context. Unfortunately
this change was made to the second sentence without making a corresponding change
in the first sentence. Thus the second sentence seems to be in conflict with the first. The
first says, in effect, that the obligor is the debtor whether or not he is the owner of the
collateral; the second says that the owner of the collateral and not the obligor, may be
the debtor if the context so requires. This may eventually be troublesome, especially
in fields such as conflicts of law. See U.C.C. § 9-103(2).
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the assets of Obscure, the senior debt (defined as an debt of Obscure
except specifically subordinated debt) shall be paid in full before the
holders of subordinated debt shall be entitled to retain any assets so
paid or distributed. In 1967 Obscure floats a bond issue and Credson
purchases one of the bonds which complies with the subordination
requirements of the loan agreement between Obscure and Conserva-
tive. In 1975 both Obscure and Credson are in bankruptcy. Credson's
trustee claims that the subordination in the 1967 bond created a secur-
ity interest in Conservative as against Credson. The trustee argues
that, since Conservative failed to perfect this interest, it is inferior to
his rights under Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act2° and under
section 9-301 of the Code.
Although this position is not tenable, counsel for lenders have
been reluctant to give opinions that no security interest is created,
perhaps because of the highly conceptual nature of the supporting
argument.' The argument is that since Credson never had any right
other than his right to payment as a subordinated creditor of Obscure,
no property of Credson was given as security for Obscure's debt to
Conservative. Contrast Credson's position here with his position in
the subsequent subordination. There, Credson loaned money to
Obscure and got a "bundle of rights" in return. He later gave up part
of this "bundle" as security for Obscure's debt to Conservative. In
the ab initio subordination, Credson did not give up part of his bundle
of rights; he simply bought a smaller bundle. He purchased a junior
interest.22 As previously mentioned, the Code's definition of security
interest states, in effect, that the secured party must have an interest
in the debtor's property which secures payment or performance of an
obligation. Here, Conservative has no such interest in Credson's
property because Credson, in purchasing a junior interest, never owned
the "property" serving as security for the obligation.
While it may be somewhat unnecessary in this discussion, it is
worthy of note that a single thread, however gossamer, runs through
all of chattel security law: protection against the secret lien. Modern
law has never been opposed to creditors obtaining lawful liens or
preferences, but it has often been opposed to obtaining these prefer-
ences or liens secretly." In the subsequent subordination it could be
20 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964). This is the so-called
"strong-arm" clause which gives the trustee the rights of an hypothetical lien creditor
as of the date of bankruptcy.
21 See text accompanying note 106 infra.
22 Golin points out that the purchaser of the junior interest is "invariably" com-
pensated for taking a subordinated position "by an interest rate somewhat higher than
the then current rate for senior debt." Golin, supra note 9, at 377.
23 See 1 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, supra note 18, § 6.01(1) (1963):
A history of chattel security could well be written in terms of the 400-year
7
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argued that Conservative obtained a kind of secret lien on Credson's
right to receive his general creditor's share on the distribution of
Obscure's assets. Such is not the case in the ab initio subordination,'
however, since there the junior creditor's position vis-à-vis the senior
debt is clear from the terms of the subordinated obligation. Thus, it
would seem that the distinction made here is not inconsistent with
the general thrust of chattel security law.
The important point, however, is that it is possible to make a
logical argument that subsequent subordinations may fit within the
Code's definition of security interest; this is not so with ab initio
subordinations, for such a finding would result in a completely im-
possible situation. Section 9-203 requires that a security agreement
be executed by the debtor in all cases where the security interest is not
perfected by possession," and failure to do so will make the security
interest unenforceable even between the parties. In the ab initio sub-
ordination situation, the purchaser of subordinated indebtedness does
not execute anything. He merely buys a bond signed by the obligor
which, by its terms, provides for the subordination. With respect to
new transactions,' it might be possible to require all bond purchasers
to execute a form of security agreement, but this would be extremely
impractical, especially in the case of a public issue of subordinated
obligations, and would not help their saleability. Moreover, it is
almost inconceivable that the drafters of the Code intended to require
that this be done.
C. Variant Forms of Subordinations
Since subordination agreements reflect the negotiations of parties
to specific financial transactions, there can be as many different
struggle by debtors and their secured creditors to create security interests of
various sorts in the debtors' property without affording notice to buyers or
other creditors, and the attendant demands by unsecured creditors generally for
some kind of notice when all or part of the debtors' assets become subject to
security interests. The parties favoring secrecy have, for the most part, been the
losers; Lord Coke . . . in 1601 . . . insisted upon sonic form of public notoriety
where the debtor transfers an interest in some or all of his property: "1st, Let
it [the transfer] be made in a public manner, and before the neighbours, and
not in private, for secrecy is a mark of fraud." 3 Coke 80b, 81a, 76 Eng. Rep.
809, 814 (Star Chamber 1601).
24
 It is true that even in the ab initio situation, the trustee in bankruptcy of
Obscure will apply to the payment of Obscure's debt to Conservative, what would
have been Credson's general creditor's share, but for the subordination provisions of
the note. See p. 24 infra. However, it is Credson's rights that the courts must look to in
determining whether a security interest has been created. And neither Credson, nor
Credson's creditors were ever entitled to payment as an unsubordinated general creditor.
26
 See p. 14 infra, with respect to the means of perfection of a subordination secur-
ity interest. The conclusion reached is that possession besides being impractical, is not
the correct method of perfecting a security interest created by a genuine subordination.
26
 See p. 22 infra, with respect to pre-Code security interests.
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variations front the subsequent/ab initio pattern as the minds of
the parties can imagine. The problem is that the more a subordination
agreement combines and varies the elements of the two types out-
lined above, the more difficult it becomes to determine whether a
security interest can be considered created and to support, on any
logical basis, the conclusion reached. Basically, however, subordina-
tions fall into the subsequent/ab initio categories previously dis-
cussed, and, for this reason, a further analysis of their elements will
help in dealing with variant forms of subordinations as they arise.
1. Subordination Ab Initio
The most significant element distinguishing the subsequent from
the ab initio subordination is the fact that in the former, the sub-
ordinating creditor, Credson, had an unrestricted general obligation
of Obscure Electronics which he later subordinated, while in the latter,
Credson invested, ab initio, in a subordinated obligation. Certainly
this distinction is crucial in determining whether Credson's interest
serves as security for Obscure's debt to Conservative. However, if
Credson had exchanged his unsubordinated note for one subordinated
on its face, could it not be argued that here, as well, Credson is giving
up an interest in property to serve as Security for Obscure's debt to
Conservative? There is no question that the new note is subordinated
ab initio for, additionally, the subordination language here is on the
face of the note itself as distinguished from the subsequent subordina-
tion where it is embodied in a separate agreement. Nevertheless,
the exchange of notes makes it more difficult to argue that the ab initio
subordination, in this particular situation, does not create a security
interest.
2. Subordination on the Face of the Instrument
Tied closely with the foregoing discussion is the fact that in the
subsequent subordination, the subordination occurred outside the
note, while the note itself in the ab initio subordination constituted a
subordinated obligation. Where the subordination language is found
in the note, it is less likely that the junior creditor ever had an interest
to serve as security for an obligation while, conversely, it is difficult
to argue that a creditor never had the right to payment as a general
creditor when the note contains no subordination language. This is
true even where the note and the subordination agreement are executed
simultaneously or where the note is exchanged for a subordinated
note. The Code, however, does not provide for perfection by incorpora-
tion on the face of an obligation but rather inquires whether the
debtor's property actually serves as security for an obligation. Thus
it would seem that incorporation of subordination language in the
9
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agreement is not, by itself, necessarily determinative as to whether a
security interest has been created.
3. Parties to the Agreement
a. Senior Creditor.—In the subsequent subordination, the actual
subordination was accomplished by agreement between the senior
creditor and the junior creditor, while in the ab initio subordination
the senior creditor was not a party to the agreement. Although it
is probably easier to argue that a security interest is created when
the senior creditor is a signatory to the agreement, it is not essential
to the definition of a security interest that this be so. Thus, subordina-
tions may create security interests even though the senior creditor
is not a party thereto. For example, assume the following change in
the subsequent subordination illustrated above: the subordination is
accomplished by agreement between Obscure and Credson, without
the senior creditor, Conservative, as a party.27 In this situation it might
be difficult for Conservative to prevent the parties at a later date
from voiding the subordination, whereas in the typical subsequent
subordination, Conservative, as a party to the agreement, would have
direct control over modifications. Nevertheless, at least until any
such modification is actually made, it may be argued that Credson's
property is serving as security for Obscure's debt to Conservative.
b. Junior Creditor.—The junior creditor was a party to the subse-
quent subordination, but in the ab initio subordination, he simply
purchased a junior obligation signed by the obligor. The most incon-
gruous aspect of this discussion is that if an ab initio subordination
were held to create a security interest, it would, subject to the discus-
sion below with respect to methods of perfection, probably be invalid
without the subordinated creditor's signature for failure to comply
with the statute of frauds requirements of section 9-203. 28
 Of course,
it would be possible to have an ab initio subordination in which the
purchaser's signature appears on the note, but this fact might tend
to support an argument that in the ab initio situation the purchaser
actually has given something up, and cloud any determination that
an ab initio subordination does not create a security interest.
4. Language of Assignment
In the above subsequent subordination example, Credson "as-
signed" certain rights in the bankruptcy of Obscure to Conservative.
27 But if the senior creditor is unaware of the subordination, the result might be
different. See In re Joe Newcomer Fin. Co., 226 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1964) in which
the court refused to enforce the subordination where it found that the holders were
not given sufficient notice that their notes were subordinated and the senior creditors had
not relied on the subordination.
28 See p. 8 supra.
10
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The ab initio subordination example, however, contained no such
assignment language, thus illustrating that most ab initio subordina-
tions do not contain such assignment language while many subsequent
subordinations do.
Assignment of Credson's note as security for Obscure's debt to
Conservative would, of course, create a security interest in the instru-
ment itself. But, as will be shortly observed,' a subordination does
not normally involve an assignment of the note, nor does the senior
creditor normally have the rights that such an assignee would be
expected to have. The assignment language being discussed here
covers the assignment of certain rights arising by virtue of the
note, such as the right to payment as a general creditor upon the
insolvency of the obligor; but even this assignment language might
be indicative of an attempt to create a security interest. However,
perhaps the majority of subsequent subordinations do not employ
any assignment language, and while it is possible to insert assign-
ment language in the ab initio subordinated debt without the subor-
dinated creditor's signature, the effect of such language would seem
questionable.
The argument is heard that where a subordination agreement con-
tains no language of assignment, but merely prescribes a contractual
hierarchy of payments, no security interest is created. 5° Certainly a
hierarchy of payments does not in itself create a security interest,
just as statutes which provide for priority of payments do not create
liens in those who have priority, either visa-vis the debtor or vis-à-vis
each other." However, it is not the hierarchy, but rather the method
by which the hierarchy is created, that determines the existence of a
security interest. Regardless of whether assignment language is em-
ployed, the legal effect in the case of the subsequent subordination
might be to create a kind of assignment of right," while in the ab
29 See p. 14 infra.
39 Mr. Coogan alludes to subordination agreements in his Code treatise and hints
that this argument may be significant:
If A in a subordination agreement assigns to B his right to collect from C A's
share of C's assets in an insolvency situation,. A's creditors may see in this a
security transaction. But not all subordination agreements involve such assign-
ments; some may prescribe a contractual hierarchy of payments. Generally,
the person whose possible insolvency we worry about is not A, but C, and
failure of B to perfect his security interest against A's creditors should have no
bearing on B's right against C in C's bankruptcy.
1 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, supra note 18, § .5.03(2)(e). He concludes that "if there is
doubt, the safe rule is to comply with Article 9." Ibid.
sr E.g., Bankruptcy Act § 64, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C. § 104
(1964). See generally 3 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 64.02[21 (14th ed. 1964).
22 See Kripke, Practice Commentary 8 to § 9-302, 62%, McKinney's Consol. Laws
of N.Y., Part 3, at 454 (1964) where he discusses whether subordinations of accounts
which are not by their terms "an assignment by the subordination creditor to the
11
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initio subordination, all the assignment language in the world would
not accomplish such an assignment if there were nothing to assign.
In any case, the prudent lender should not rely on the presence or
absence of assignment language in determining whether or not a
security interest has been created by terms of the Code definition,
although such language is one of the factors which may be considered
in determining whether a subordination creates a security interest.
5. Subordination in Favor of One Senior Creditor
In the above subsequent subordination illustration the subordina-
tion was in favor of Conservative only, while in the ab initio subor-
dination the note was subordinated to all other indebtedness. The
fact that the subordination is in favor of one creditor would seem
to give some support to the position that the subordinating creditor's
rights are serving as security for the obligation to that senior creditor,
but, although the definition of security interest speaks in terms of
securing "an obligation,”" there is little basis for arguing that specific
personal property cannot serve as security for several obligations.
After all, as to each security interest held by each senior creditor,
the property serves as security for an obligation. In any case, it would
seem that this is another variable which may be employed by the
parties to confound their attorneys, and the courts.
It should be clear from this discussion of some elements of subor-
dinations that the more these elements are varied, the more difficult
it becomes to determine whether a security interest has been created
and to justify the Code's involvement with subordination agreements.
II. "PERFECTION" OF SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT
SECURITY INTERESTS
Generally, an unperfected security interest under the Code is
practically valueless. Section 9-301(1) lists those persons who take
priority over unperfected security interests. They include, inter alia,
anyone with a perfected security interest, lien creditors without
priority creditor," amount to an assignment and thus a security interest. He states that:
it could be argued that a subordination constitutes an assignment in legal effect,
because upon a distribution in bankruptcy or similar procedure the share which
would otherwise be distributed to the subordinating creditor is given to the
priority creditor. At any rate, that problem is usually rendered moot because
the subordination is typically accompanied by express language of assignment.
Here it would seem Mr. Kripke is referring to an outright assignment of the accounts
themselves as distinguished from the type of assignment language which might normally
be used in connection with subordination of notes or debentures. Since the writing of
the Practice Commentary quoted above, Mr. Kripke has refined his views and now
believes that the argument that the subordination of an account is an assignment of the
account would be specious.
33 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
12
UNDER THE SPREADING U.C.C.
knowledge and a trustee in bankruptcy." It is essential, therefore, for
a secured party to see that his security interest is perfected. Of course
one must not conclude that once the security interest is perfected it is
good against all the world, for what Mr. Coogan calls the "quality" of
the security interest will determine its strength vis-à-vis certain con-
flicting interests;" but it must be perfected if it is to afford any
adequate protection against third parties.
Section 9-303 states that a security interest is perfected "when it
has attached and when all of the applicable steps required for perfection
have been taken." (Emphasis supplied.) This normally requires four
steps: three making the security interest attach and the fourth per-
fecting it. The three requirements for attachment specified in section
9-204 are (1) an agreement that the security interest attach; (2) the
giving of "value"; and (3) the debtor's obtaining "rights" in the
collateral."
When a subsequent subordination agreement has been signed
and the senior creditor has extended credit to the obligor, these three
steps would seem to have been taken. When Conservative makes the
loan to Obscure, it has given value; when Credson made his loan to
Obscure two years before, he became entitled to payment under
Obscure's note and thus acquired rights in the collateral. Of course,
it could be argued that the parties never agreed that the security
interest attach, especially where they never believed that a security
interest was created. It would appear, however, that agreement by the
parties that the subordination agreement become effective would
constitute agreement that any security interest created thereby should
attach.37 On the other hand, if it should be found that a security interest
were created in connection with the ab initio subordination, it would be
more difficult to argue that the parties agreed that the security interest
34 U.C.C. § 9-301 provides that even though the trustee had knowledge of the
unperfected security interest, he will still be prior to it "unless all the creditors repre-
sented had knowledge of the security interest." However, even if all the creditors had
knowledge, it would seem that § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, which has been inter-
preted as giving the trustee the rights of an "ideal" hypothetical lien creditor, would
afford the trustee all the priority he needs. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 30 Stat. 565 (1898),
as amended 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964); see generally 4 Collier, Bankruptcy II 70.99 (14th
ed. 1964).
s5 1 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, supra note 18, § 3.03 (1963). For example, a perfected
security interest in after-acquired property may be subordinate to holders of later
perfected purchase money security interests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3), (4). And, a security
interest perfected by filing is invalid even between the parties if a security agreement
describing the collateral is not signed by the debtor pursuant to § 9-203.
33 U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
37 It would do the senior creditor no good to argue that there was no such agree-
ment. This would make the subordination no less a security interest. It would only
mean that the security interest did not attach, and that in addition to everyone else,
holders of prior unperfected security interests in the same collaterll would take pri-
ority. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(c).
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attach. Further, it is difficult to see how it could be maintained that the
debtor ever had rights in the collateral (i.e., the right to payment as
a general creditor) unless it is argued that the collateral is the note it-
self. This will be discussed in more detail below.
The fourth step which perfects an attached security interest gen-
erally consists of filing a financing statement or taking possession of
the collateral, although under some special circumstances perfection
may be had without taking either of these steps." The method of per-
fection will depend upon the kind of collateral involved. There are
seven classifications of personal property collateral in Article 9." Most
corporate subordination agreements involve the subordination of a note
or debenture. When such is the case, we can safely eliminate five cate-
gories and state that the collateral will be classified either as "instru-
ments" or as "general intangibles!'
A. The Collateral as Instruments
A security interest in an instrument may be perfected by tak-
ing possession of the instrument; filing will not be sufficient.' In
our example of the subsequent subordination, if the agreement were
an attempt to create a security interest in Obscure's note to Credson,
then Conservative could perfect only by taking possession of the
note. While Credson might be willing to give up possession of his
note, the subordinating creditor's position might be quite different
were he not an officer of the obligor.
As we move closer to the ab initio subordination, it becomes
increasingly difficult - to convince the subordinating creditor to re-
linquish the note, and in the strict ab initio subordination situation,
it becomes virtually impossible. Consider the reaction of banks, in-
vestment companies and members of the debenture buying public to
Obscure's offer to sell subordinated debentures under the stipulation
that the purchaser get no debentures. And, consider further the plight
of Conservative Insurance Company in trying to police the subordina-
tion. Conservative might not even know that Obscure has floated an-
other issue of debentures, much less know who all the purchasers are.
38 See generally U.C.C. § 9-302; note 41 infra.
38 The seven types of collateral and the sections of the Code in which they are
defined are as follows: § 9-105(1)(h) (Chattel Paper); § 9-105(1)(e) (Documents);
§ 9-105(1)(f) (Goods); § 9-105(1)(g) (Instruments); § 9-106 (Accounts); § 9-106
(Contract Rights); and § 9-106 (General Intangibles).
40 Where a note or debenture is not involved, the collateral may fit within one
or more of the other types. See p. 20 infra.
41 U.C.C. § 9-304(1). However, under certain circumstances a security interest
may be perfected in an instrument without filing or the taking of possession. See
§ 9-304(4) which provides for such perfection for 21 days from the date of attachment,
and § 9-304(5) which permits some secured parties to deliver to the debtor, for 21 days,
instruments perfected by possession, for specific purposes such as collection.
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Fortunately, it is fairly clear that, at least in the ab initio
situation, there is little likelihood that the subordination creates a se-
curity interest. And the difficulty of perfection, as an instrument or
otherwise, is probably another argument in support of that conclusion.
However, until that conclusion is supported by an amendment to the
Code or by court decision, all doubt cannot be removed. Thus the
question of whether a subordination agreement creates a security in-
terest in an instrument is an important otie. Yet here, too, the answer
is not'entirely clear.
"Instrument" is defined in section 9-105(1) (g) of the Code as
follows :
"Instrument" means a negotiable instrument (defined in Sec-
tion 3-104), or a security (defined in Section 8-102) or any
other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money
and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery
with any necessary indorsement or assignment.
"Instrument," then, is not limited to negotiable paper but may
be almost any writing evidencing an indebtedness and normally trans-
ferred by delivery as long as it is not a security agreement or lease.
Clearly, the subordination agreement itself is not an instrument. It
does not evidence any obligation, is not normally transferred by de-
livery and may even be a security agreement. The real danger is that
the subordination agreement will be held to be an attempt to assign,
or create a security interest in the note itself, and the note is clearly
an instrument.
It should be noted that assignment language in a subordination
agreement which purports to assign the entire note as collateral security
for the obligation would undoubtedly create a security interest in the
note itself, and thus be a security interest in an instrument. However,
such assignments are rare. In most cases, assignment language, if it
appears at all in the subordination agreement, is only an assignment
of certain rights arising by virtue of the note, such as in the subsequent
subordination example where the right to payment as a general creditor
in bankruptcy was assigned. The question is whether in those cases
where there is assignment language covering only certain rights aris-
ing under the note, and in the majority of cases where there is no as-
signment language at all, the subordination agreement will be deemed
tantamount to an assignment of, or lien upon, the note itself. The
answer should be that any such assignment or lien reaches only cer-
tain rights arising under the note, and not the note itself. Thus the
collateral should not be classified as instruments.
The senior creditor in a genuine subordination situation does not
15
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have the same rights he would have had if the notes were also pledged
as security. Subordination agreements vary greatly in form and it is
dangerous to generalize. However, the more typical provisions support
the conclusion that the collateral is not an instrument. Many subordi-
nation agreements provide that no payments may be made on the
junior debt until the senior debt is paid in full; or that upon the obli-
gor's bankruptcy, the junior creditor's share is assigned to the senior
creditor; or that the junior creditor is permitted to receive payment
and dispose of the proceeds for his own benefit without accounting to
the senior creditor" only until the liquidation of the obligor, at
which time the senior debt will be paid in full before any further
payment is made on the junior debt.
An assignee of the note would not be restricted to these rights. If
the note itself were assigned, the senior creditor could, on default by
the obligor under the senior indebtedness, foreclose his interest in the
assigned indebtedness, have the security sold for whatever it was
worth, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the senior indebted-
ness. While it is highly unlikely that the senior creditor would take
such steps since both notes have the same obligor, the fact that the
senior creditor has such a right points up the difference between an
assignment of the note and a mere subordination. Under the language
of the usual subordination agreement, the senior creditor could not
sell the junior obligation if he desired.
In Mr. Calligar's article on this subject, 43
 which does not cover
the effect of the Code on subordinations, there is a discussion of whether
it would be wise for the senior creditor to insist on a collateral assign-
ment of the subordinated debt in the agreement. The clear implication
is that there would be no assignment without such express language.
Mr. Calligar points out that the junior creditors are generally opposed
to the inclusion of such assignment language because they would lose
the degree of control over the debt they retained under the usual sub-
ordination agreement. Further, the author states that such an assign-
ment might contravene the terms of a negative pledge clause between
the junior creditor and his creditor, and would cover only present
indebtedness, requiring supplemental assignments to perfect equitable
assignments of future debt as such debt comes into existence. Finally,
he maintains that the senior creditor might not want an assignment
because on bankruptcy the responsibility for filing proofs of claim
42 With the advent of § 9-205, this language should no longer make an assignment
for security invalid and fraudulent as to creditors under the "Dominion Rule," as
expanded by Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 363 (1925), and later cases. See Zinman,
Dominion and the Factor's Lien: Does Section 45 of the New York Personal Property
Law Abrogate the "Dominion Rule"? 30 Fordham L. Rev. 59, 61-64 (1961).
43 Calligar, supra note 9, at 397-98.
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might then devolve on him. What Mr. Calligar is saying, then, is that
there are many results, affecting both the senior and junior creditor,
which occur when the note is assigned as security, but do not obtain
when there is simply a subordination.
It should be re-emphasized that the argument is not being made
that there cannot be an assignment of, or lien on, the note itself as
part of a subordination transaction. If there is such an assignment
or lien, the fact that there is also a subordination agreement will not
alter the fact that a security interest is created in a note. What is
contended is that in the ordinary subordination situation, the language
used does not constitute an assignment of, and hence, an outright
security interest in the note.
As a practical matter, this is the interpretation which has, in the
past, been placed on subordination agreements by the parties, long
before the problem of perfection under the Code was even a twinkle
in lender's counsel's eye. As a general rule lenders will not take an
assignment of a note for security without obtaining possession even
where it is fairly clear that the note is not negotiable. Lenders would
not as a general rule, however, demand possession of the note when
it had been subordinated, for the parties never considered the sub-
ordination as constituting an assignment of, or security interest in, the
note. The parties' intention in this respect is significant, for while the
Code says that a security interest in a note is a security interest in an
instrument, it would appear that the courts should look to the intention
of the parties to determine whether, in fact, they did create a security
interest in a note."
Notwithstanding the force of the above argument, some attor-
neys might be reluctant to advise their clients that a court would not
hold the other way. A court might argue, probably incorrectly, that
even if the wording of the typical subordination agreement does not
encompass all that is usually found in an assignment of a note, it is
tantamount to such assignment and should be considered as such. The
Code sorely needs clarification on this point.
44 See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a). Mr. Henson, commenting on a subsequent subordina-
tion of an "inside loan," indicates the security interest is in the note itself. He said: "H the
inside loan is not evidenced by an instrument, one can be executed and pledged to the
bank, thus creating a perfected security interest in the instrument," Henson, supra note
18, at 693. Mr. Henson feels that this subsequent subordination transaction "is intended
to and does involve a security interest, and it is easily accommodated under the Code."
Ibid. Rather than being the intention of the parties, it would seem from the above
discussion that the creation of a security interest in the note itself is far from the
parties' minds. Of course, it is possible for the parties to attempt to obviate their Code
problem by converting a subsequent subordination into an assignment of an instrument
as security. But surely the drafters did not intend to force the parties to change the
terms of their agreement in order that it may be accommodated under the Code.
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B. The Collateral as General Intangibles
Section 9-106 defines general intangibles as "any personal prop-
erty (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, contract
rights, chattel paper, documents and instruments." In the words of
the Comment to this section," the term "brings under this Article
miscellaneous types of contractual rights and other personal property
which are used or may become customarily used as commercial se-
curity." The original draft of the Code" did not include "general in-
tangibles" as one of the types of collateral. The only intangibles were
"accounts" and "contract rights;" the term "general intangibles" was
inserted as an additional "catch-all" classification pursuant to the 1956
Recommendations of the Sponsoring Organizations' Editorial Board.'"
Obviously it was impossible to classify good will, literary rights and
rights to performance as rights "to payment under a contract?'" Fur-
ther, if the Code were to remain viable under changing commercial
practices, it would have to provide for "developing forms of col-
lateral."" This was accomplished by adding the category of "general
45 Comments of the Sponsoring Organizations. These comments are found in the
Official Text editions of the Code, and also in many state versions. Some states have
promulgated their own comments as a supplement to the official version. The com-
ments were meant to "set forth the purpose of various provisions of this Act to promote
uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against
misconstruction." ALI & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
supra note 11, at 1.
46 See Final Text Edition, November 1951, promulgated by the Sponsoring Organiza-
tions. While the Code was not in final edition until the fall of 1951, there are various
earlier drafts which make interesting reading. Compare, e.g., the Proposed Final Draft,
Spring 1950, with Tentative Draft No. 1, Art. VII (now Article 9), April 21, 1948.
47 See ALI & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1956
Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, 161.
46
 "Contract Rights" are defined in § 9-106 as "any right to payment under a
contract not yet earned by performance." The Comment to § 9-106 mentions good will,
literary rights and rights to performance as examples of what was meant by "general
intangibles."
46 See Action of Sponsoring Organizations for the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code with Respect to Views of Special Committee of the American Bankers Association
89 (March 27, 1957). Although they had found that Article 9 "contains a brilliance of
concept and a boldness of approach that cannot be ignored and should not be discharged,"
the American Bankers Association had refused to recommend it for adoption and
criticized many of its provisions in the Report of its Special Committee on the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code, dated October 17, 1954. Id. at 77. The Sponsoring Organiza-
tions were most anxious to obtain the support of the American Bankers Association
which support would have a significant effect on the conclusions of the New York Law
Revision Commission, then holding its extensive hearings on the Code. As a result of
conferences and meetings, the "Action of the Sponsoring Organizations" memorandum
was promulgated on March 27, 1957. In 1954 the Bankers had criticized § 9-106, which at
the time did not include a category of "general intangibles," because "your Committee
is not yet convinced of the desirability of including in Article 9 or in any similar statute,
intangibles other than commercial accounts of the kind normally included in accounts
receivable financing." Id. at 83. In the 1957 memorandum, that criticism was answered
by Mr. Homer L. Kripke who stated that the provision, now including general intangi-
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intangibles." This seems to be the only category encompassing the
miscellaneous rights arising out of subordinations of notes or de-
bentures.
Security interests in general intangibles may be perfected only
by filing,50 while security interests in instruments can generally be
perfected only by possession. Consequently, an abundance of caution
might require the senior creditor to file a financing statement and ob-
tain possession of the instrument in order to be fully protected.
Further complications arise in multi-state transactions and a care-
ful study must be made of the Code's conflicts' provisions in order to
determine what law, or laws, apply. Basically, section 9-103(2) pro-
vides that the law of the jurisdiction where the "debtor" has his chief
place of business will govern with respect to general intangibles. How-
ever, if such jurisdiction does not provide for perfection by filing, "the
security interest may be perfected by filing in this state." The problems
here are many but somewhat outside the scope of this paper since they
are generally applicable to all security interests in general intangibles.
Some of the more significant questions to be resolved are: (1) Who is
the "debtor"?" (2) Where is the "chief place of business"? 52 (3)
What is meant by "may be perfected by filing in this state"?" For-
bles, "brings the law up to date by recognizing developing forms of collateral and pro-
vides rules for perfection and enforcement of security interests therein." Id, at 89.
5° U.C.C. § 9-302(1). But see Cal. Commercial Code § 9302(1) (g), which exempts
general intangibles from the requirement of filing. See Mr. Coogan's comments on this.
2 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the U.C.C. § 21.05(2) (d) (1964).
51 The Code defines "debtor" to include either the obligor or the owner of the
collateral or both if the context so requires. See note 19 supra. In the subordination
situation the owner of the collateral (Credson) and the obligor (Obscure) are always
different people. While one would think - that Credson's state's law should govern, it
would be wise to conform as well to the law of Obscure's chief place of business when
that differs from Credson's.
62 The drafters comment that the "chief place of business" while not defined in
the Code, is the place "from which in fact the debtor manages the main part of his
business operations . . . the place where persons dealing with the debtor would normally
look for credit information. .. ." U.C.C, § 9-103, Comment 3. Where there is doubt, as in
a situation where there are autonomous regional offices, Comment 3 states that there
would have to be "filing in each of several places." More important a problem is the
movement of the chief place of business. Under the Official Code, on such a move
to a new jurisdiction, the law of the new jurisdiction will have to be complied with.
See U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 5, which states in part that if the chief place of business
is moved into "this state," "the secured party should file in this state." In New York,
U.C.C. § 9-103(6) provides that "the validity and perfection of a security interest
in accounts, contract rights or general intangibles continues even though after the security
interest has attached the office where the assignor of accounts or contract rights keeps
his records concerning them or the chief place of business of the debtor is moved to
some other jurisdiction." The Permanent Editorial Board did not recommend the New
York provision for general adoption on the ground that it "protects the secured party
at the expense of subsequent creditors" who will be unable to determine from the
record "the true state of the debtor's affairs." See Report No. 2 of the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code 172 (1964).
53 The meaning of this phrase is somewhat obscure: the provision is permissive
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tunately, in the vast majority of situations the facts are such that these
problems do not seem to arise. Where they do, however, they can make
your hair stand on end.
C. Other Possibilities
When a note is subordinated, the only two types of collateral
normally involved are instruments and general intangibles. However,
where the subordination involves something other than what the Code
defines as an instrument, something other than a note, debenture or the
like, the security may be other types of collateral.
1. Accounts, Contract Rights
In connection with some corporate loan agreements, for example,
a parent or subsidiary of the obligor may agree to extend credit or
supply goods or services to the obligor on an open account basis. The
parent or subsidiary may agree that the right to payment for any
credit so extended or any goods or services so supplied shall be sub-
ordinated to the obligor's debt to the institutional lender. Here there
is no note involved: what is being subordinated are rights to payment
under a contract and accounts receivable, "contract rights"" and "ac-
counts" under Code terminology. 55 The subordination may be either
("may") and it is not clear what happens if the parties do not take the hint; it speaks
only of perfection and still leaves the security interest subject to the laws of the state
of the debtor's chief place of business, other than the law relating to perfection; and the
words, "this state," on their face at least, seem to give the parties the option of per-
fecting in any state that has adopted the Code, which fails to simplify the process of
searching the record. No mention of the general intangibles conflicts problems would
be complete without a reference to the incomprehensible insertion of the words "general
intangibles" in New York's own § 9-302(1)(i). As it applies to general intangibles, the
subsection seems to say that if an assignor of accounts keeps his records concerning the
accounts in a jurisdiction outside the United States, you do not have to file to perfect
a security interest in general intangibles. Obviously, something is wrong.
oa U.C.C. § 9-106 defines contract rights as rights "to payment under a contract
not yet earned by performance." The Comment gives as examples of performance
"deliveries" made or "work" completed. It would seem that the extension of credit
or the making of an advance by the parent or subsidiary to the obligor would constitute
"performance" under the above definition.
55 U.C.C. § 9-106. Contract rights are described in the Comment to § 9-106 as
"potential accounts." This is not always the case. Accounts are limited by the definition
of rights to payment "for goods sold or leased or for services rendered." A right to pay-
ment under a contract governing patent rights would be a contract right. When this
contract right matured, it might not mature into an account because it would not be a
right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered. It would thus
probably mature into a general intangible. So if there were a subordination of a right
to payment under such a patent contract which amounted to a security interest, the
collateral might change in midstream from contract rights to general intangibles. For-
tunately, filing is required for perfection of accounts, contract rights and general
intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-302. However, different conflict rules apply to accounts and
contract rights as distinguished from general intangibles. See U.C.C. § 9-103. "This
slippage between the definitions of 'contract rights' and 'accounts' was the result of draft-
ing inadvertence," said Professor Grant Gilmore, Associate Reporter and Reporter for
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"subsequent" or "oh initio" and the same rules and problems which
arise in determining whether a security interest is created with respect
to the subordination of a note are applicable here. If it is determined
that a security interest is created, perfection ordinarily must be by
filing." In multi-state transactions, the law of the jurisdiction where
the assignor of the accounts or contract rights keeps his records con-
cerning them will generally govern. However, there are conflicts prob-
lems here too.'
2. Chattel Paper
In other circumstances, a security interest itself may be sub-
ordinated. The Code specifically recognizes such subordination in sec-
tion 9-316 where it provides that "nothing in this Article prevents sub-
ordination by agreement by any person entitled to priority." It does
not, however, discuss the consequences of such subordination from the
standpoint of creating security interests.
When a security agreement or lease serves as collateral, it is called
"chattel paper" under the Code.'s Here the problem is similar to that
which arose in connection with the subordination of a note. Assume,
for example, that a chattel mortgage is subordinated. If the subordina-
tion agreement is construed as creating a security interest in the chattel
mortgage itself, the collateral would be "chattel paper." But if the
subordination creates a security interest only in certain rights arising
out of the chattel mortgage, the collateral is probably our old friend,
general intangibles. A security interest in chattel paper may be per-
fected either by filing or by possession." However, perfection of a
security interest in chattel paper by filing is a kind of "second class"
perfection in that a purchaser of the chattel paper without knowledge
in the ordinary course of his business will take priority over the
security interest thus created." The law of the jurisdiction where the
Article 9 from 1946 to 1952. Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precar-
ious Security, 74 Yale L.J. 217, 250 (1964). See generally 2 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts,
supra note 50, § 15.05.
58 U.C.C. § 9-302. The rule is, however, not without exceptions. See, e.g., U.C.C.
§ 9-302(1)(e) on insignificant assignments.
57 U.C.C. § 9-103. Some of these problems involve (a) determining the record
keeping office, (b) the change in the law resulting from the change in location of the
record keeping office (except in New York—see note 52 supra), and (c) determining
what is an "appropriate" relation to the state in applying optional subsection (5) where
the records are kept outside the United States. By and large these problems are a little
easier to deal with than those arising in connection with general intangibles.
68 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) defines chattel paper as "a writing or writings which
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or lease of specific goods.
When a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an
instrument or series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes
chattel paper."
59 U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -304.
5° U.C.C. § 9-308.
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chattel paper is located will govern' and the main conflicts problem
revolves around what happens when there are an unknown number
of executed counterparts at large in the country.
The point made here is that, while in most situations, subordina-
tions, if they create security interests at all, create them in instruments
or general intangibles, other types of collateral cannot be ignored. It
is, therefore, necessary to look to what is being subordinated before a
determination is made as to what the collateral is.
D. Pre-Code Subordinations
Under non-uniform transition provisions adopted in New York,
California and Wisconsin, the perfection of all security interests which
were perfected without filing prior to the adoption of the Code, and
which would have required a filing had the Code been in effect, will
lapse unless a continuation statement is filed by the secured party un-
der the Code within a specified period of time.° 2
New York, which was the first to adopt this non-uniform pro-
vision, originally required the filing of the continuation statement
within twelve months of the date the Code became effective. With
time for such filing about to run out," the legislature amended section
10-102(2) to extend the period for filing such continuation statements
from twelve to thirty-six months in all cases except those in which the
collateral was accounts.°4 This change was necessitated by the fact
that problems such as those discussed herein made unclear exactly
what was covered by the broad definition of security interest. In ad-
dition, institutional lenders and others were hard pressed to complete
a review of their portfolios in time to file on the date specified."
An effort was made to induce the California legislature to again
follow New York and enact a similar amendment. However, some in
California felt that such a change was unnecessary inasmuch as filing
is not required there for security interests in general intangibles." What
may have been overlooked is that some subordination agreements, if
61 U.C.C. 1 9-102(1).
62 U.C.C. 1 10-102. The list of states requiring the filing of continuation statements
for pre-Code security interests originally perfected without filing may have been in-
creased by action of 1965 legislatures, unavailable at the date of publication of this
article.
63
 The New York Code became effective on September 27, 1964, and all such
continuation statements were to have been filed by September 26, 1965.
64
 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 868.
65
 Since anything in a loan agreement which made payment more probable might
fit within the broad language of 1-201(37), a careful study of each of many thousands
of individual transactions must be made by many lending institutions. This can be a diffi-
cult task.
60
 These views were expressed rather forcefully by Mr. Robert L. Hunt, Vice Presi-
dent and General Counsel of the Security First National Bank.
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they do create security interests, do not necessarily create them in
general intangibles. From the discussion above it is clear that subordi-
nation agreement security interests may be in accounts, contract rights
or chattel paper, all of which require or permit perfection by filing—
even in California. 07
 Furthermore, the area of subordination agree-
ments is not the only one under the Code where many felt that no
security interest was created prior to the Code but where filing may now
be required. For one example, the assignment of a so-called "back-stop"
agreement, by which a parent or subsidiary of the borrower will agree
to buy certain of the borrower's products whether the borrower pro-
duces them or not, probably creates a security interest in contract
rights." In any case, the cut-off date for the filing of .continuation
statements in California remains December 31, 1965. In Wisconsin,
the time limit is June 30, 1966." In these three states, then, if it is de-
termined that a subordination agreement creates a security interest,"
it may be necessary to file a continuation statement to preserve its
perfection. Outside of these states, the uniform provision, or variations
thereof, which would not appear to require that any action be taken
with respect to pre-Code subordinations,71 have been adopted.
III. THE RISK
If a lender wishes to protect himself fully against the possibility
that a subordination agreement creates a security interest, he may
decide to obtain possession of the notes being subordinated and to
file financing statements in the appropriate places. However, there
is no doubt that there will be many situations where the senior
creditor will be unable to comply with these requirements, either
because it is impossible to do so, or because the expense of compliance
will be prohibitive. In these circumstances the senior creditor will have
to consider the risk of loss in failing to comply with all the possible
Code requirements in determining whether the loan should be made.
Fortunately, the risk is not as great as it might at first seem. The
agreements will be valid between the parties, and third parties, such
07 See p. 20 supra.
08 See note 6 supra.
(39 Wis. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 51.
10
 Conflicts rules cannot be ignored here. For example, if general intangibles are
involved, the law of New York would he applied if the debtor's chief place of business
were located there. Also the law of New York might apply if the conflicts rules of
another jurisdiction would require the application of New York law. Finally, if the
chief place of business were located in New York when the loan was made but later
moved to another jurisdiction, the law of New York would still be applicable (perhaps
in addition to the law of the other jurisdiction) because New York's version of the
Code provides that movement of the chief place of business will not change the
applicable law. See N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-103(6).
71 U.C.C. § 10-102(2). This section provides that pre-Code transactions may be
"terminated, completed, consummated or enforced" under the old law.
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as the trustee in bankruptcy, will become involved only when the
obligor or the junior creditor becomes insolvent."
A. Insolvency of the Obligor
Under pre-Code law, the courts have generally enforced sub-
ordination agreements upon the insolvency of the obligor and applied
the junior creditor's share to the debt owed the senior creditor to the
extent necessary to make the latter whole." In such cases, however,
the courts have felt it necessary to justify this enforcement by fitting
the subordination agreement into some tested legal cubbyhole.' Mr.
72
 This statement ignores the possibility of transfer of the subordinated note to a
third party before insolvency. If the subordination was of the ab initio type and the
subordination language was found in the note itself, no problem would arise. How-
ever, in a subsequent subordination where the subordination language is contained in
an agreement outside the note, trouble could arise on transfer, but it would not differ
greatly from that existing prior to the Code. Thus, if the note were negotiable, the
holder in due course would take free of the subordination agreement whether or not
the subordination agreement were deemed to create a security interest and whether or
not the security interest were in the note itself or in certain rights arising from the
note. This result would appear to be the same before as well as after the Code (see
II 9-309 and 3-305). Where the note is not negotiable, transfer to the bona fide pur-
chaser would serve only to cut off outstanding equities, unless some form of estoppel
is employed against the senior creditor. See 46 Am. Jur. Sales § 464 (1943). Some pre-
Code cases justified the enforcement of subordination agreements on the ground that
they were equitable liens or equitable assignments. See text at note 81 infra. Transfer
to the bona fide purchaser would normally cut off equitable rights. However, if the
"equitable" interest were perfected under the Code, it could be argued that transfer
could not cut off the security interest. Here, then, is a situation where perfection
under the Code might be helpful in obtaining rights that might not have been available
prior to the Code.
73
 See Austin v. National Discount Corp., 322 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir. 1963). In
,one case, however, a bankruptcy referee refused to enforce the subordination because
it was not a legal assignment and, since there was no appropriation of a fund to be
assigned, it did not amount to an equitable assignment. In re Goodman-Kinstler Cigar
Co., 32 Am. Bankr. R. 624 (S.D. Cal. 1914). The court said: "The bankruptcy court
should not be involved in the enforcement of a covenant between the bank and the
claimant which does not amount to an equitable assignment, and the bankruptcy
court has no jurisdiction to enforce such a covenant." Id. at 628. This case seems to be
a lark and does not appear to have been followed, at least with respect to subordination
agreements on the bankruptcy of the obligor. It was specifically disapproved in Bird Sr
Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935). As will be seen from the dis-
cussion above, some courts have found equitable assignments in similar circumstances
and others, not feeling themselves "pinioned on the horns" of this referee's dilemma,
were able to find other theories to affirm the subordination. But cf. In re Railroad
Supply Co., 78 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1935) and Nixon v. Michaels 38 F.2d 420 (8th Cir.
1930).
74
 Mr. Calligar comments that the theories employed by the courts were conclu-
sionary, and that they were "ways of rationalizing, rather than reaching, a desired
result. In total, they show a general willingness on the part of courts to find a legal
reason to enforce subordination agreements." Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70
Yale L.J. 376, 389 (1961). At least one court felt the theories of enforcement were
secondary to the substance of the transaction and the intention of the parties. Thus
in In re Itemlab, Inc., 197 F. Supp, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) the court upheld a subsequent
subordination either as an equitable lien, equitable assignment or a constructive trust.
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Everett and Mr. Calligar 7° have discussed these cases and the theories
employed therein at length. This author will not repeat these discus-
sions but will merely point out that there are primarily four theories
in vogue and that they tend to parallel, to some extent, the distinctions
made herein between the subsequent and the ab initio subordinations.
The four theories are: ( 1 ) the equitable assignment; 77 (2) the
equitable lien; 78 (3) the contract; 79 and (4) the constructive trust' ,
Two of these have a distinct flavor of a security transaction—the equi-
table assignment and the equitable lien.' It was Judge Learned Hand
in the landmark Schinzel & Son case62 who said that since there was
no outright mortgage or pledge as security, any right in the senior
creditor must have been "by an equitable lien." He stated that the
75 Everett, Subordinate Debt---Nature, and Enforcement, 20 Bus. Law. 953 (1965).
76 Calligar, supra note 74, at 383-92.
77 See In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932),
where the court found that a subsequent subordination amounted to an agreement to
"convey a present title to the claimants." Id. at 98. The court also speaks of "enforce-
ment of a valid contract." Id. at 99.
78 See Searle v. Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., 249 Fed. 942 (9th Cir. 1918), cert.
denied, 248 U.S. 592 (1918); In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1926) ; and Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Engleman, 101 Cal. App. 2d
390, 225 P.2d 597 (1950).
79 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Erickson, 117 F.2d 796 (9th
Cir. 1941) (citing equitable lien as well as contract theory cases) In re Aktiebolaget
Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938); Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, supra
note 73; and In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, Elias
v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944). But see In re
Joe Newcomer Finance Co., 226 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1964) where the court based
its conclusion on a third party beneficiary contract theory and refused to enforce the
subordination provisions of the notes on the ground that the holders were not given
sufficient notice that their notes were subordinated (each note was entitled "Subordinated
Debenture Note"), and that the senior creditors had not relied on the subordination
language.
80
 In the Matter of Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Sum), 647 (D.N.H. 1956),
aff'd sub nom. Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co. v. Delaware Mills, Inc., 244 F.2d 314 (1st
Cir. 1957). In this case the subordinating creditor (the obligor's principal stockholder's
wife) attempted to waive her claim in bankruptcy to enable the obligor company to
retain the award which would have gone to the senior creditor. The court rejected the
equitable lien and equitable assignment theories but found that the subordinating creditor
could not waive her rights because by virtue of the agreement she was a constructive
trustee for the senior creditor. One recalls Professor Scott's dictum to his class about
constructive trusts. "Did you ever see a constructive horse?" he asked. "The one thing
you know about a constructive horse," he said, "is that it isn't a horse."
81 Cases in this area are not helpful in solving the question of whether the subordi-
nation, if it is a lien or assignment, is a lien or an assignment of the note itself or
of certain rights arising by virtue of the note. See p. 14 supra. In re Handy-Andy
Community Stores, Inc., supra note 77 (no discussion); In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son,
Inc., supra note 78 (equitable claim) and Searle v. Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., supra
note 78 (equitable lien) spoke of an interest in the funds in the hands of the bankruptcy
court. Mr. Goan comments that "the theory of assignment comes into play only as a
prop to sustain the practical enforcement of the ranking agreement." Galin, Debt Subordi-
nation as a Working Tool, 7 N.Y.L.F. 370, 371 (1961).
82
 In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., supra note 78, at 289.
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junior creditors intended that the senior creditor have first call on
any payments made, and from this arose an equitable claim as against
the signing creditors. In this case, and in the other cases involving the
equitable lien or equitable assignment theory, the subordination was
a subsequent subordination, or close to it."
Where a subsequent subordination is not involved, the cases in-
variably utilize other theories. The contract theory would seem to be
"the most logically supportable and sensible of all the theories'
whether the subordination is of the "subsequent" or "ab initio" type,
and has been employed in both situations. In any case, the courts have
enforced the subordination on the bankruptcy of the obligor. There
should be no reason why the bankruptcy court should refuse to carry
out an agreement between two of the bankrupt-obligor's creditors since
it does not affect the rights of the other creditors. The Code should
not change this result, Even if a security interest were created, it
would operate against the junior creditor, and thus it would be the
junior creditor's bankruptcy where the unperfected subordination
would be vulnerable. However, there is at least one question of inter-
pretation here which will now be discussed.
As was noted above, several of the pre-Code cases enforced the
subordination on the ground that an equitable lien or equitable assign-
ment bad been created. Section 60(a) (6) of the Bankruptcy Act"
declares that "recognition" of equitable liens is contrary to the policy
of the section where available means of perfecting legal liens have not
been employed. The argument follows that the Code provides an avail-
able means of perfecting what were equitable liens prior to the Code,
and that the bankruptcy courts therefore should not recognize the un-
perfected subordination security interest. This might seem to be sup-
ported by the next sentence of section 60(a) (6)" which provides that
a transfer creating an equitable lien is not perfected if the applicable
law required a filing and there was none.
This entire argument, however, ignores the fact that the section
88 In Schinzel & Son, the creditors agreed with the bankrupt obligor in writing
in effect that all persons who would supply goods to the obligor would have priority
over their claims. In Searle, supra note 78, the junior creditors had signed a subordination
agreement covering notes already held by them. The court found an equitable lien.
In Handy-Andy, supra note 77, two officers of the obligor agreed with a bank to subor-
dinate their claim for $20,000 to a prospective loan from the bank for $15,000. There
was no assignment language in the agreement; the language provided that "in the event
of insolvency or liquidation, your note aforesaid shall be paid as between you and
us by preference and priority, over our claim." Id. at 98. The court said that assignment
language was unnecessary since the document amounted to an agreement to convey
present title to the senior creditor which became enforceable as an equitable assignment.
84 Calligar, supra note 74, at 388.
85
 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (6) (1964).
86 Ibid.
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was designed to protect the general creditors of the bankrupt. To deny
enforcement of the subordination agreement in this situation does not
help the bankrupt's creditors one whit. The same amount of money
must be paid out of the bankrupt's estate to the parties to the sub-
ordination agreement. Enforcement of the subordination merely means
that the trustee will apply the junior creditor's share to the senior
creditor to the extent necessary to make the senior creditor whole.
Section 60(a) (6) was added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1950, when
the lien creditor test of when a transfer takes place, for the purpose
of the preference provisions, was substituted for the bona fide pur-
chaser test." The change was necessary because of certain cases which
indicated that some customary and widely used security transactions
might be struck down as preferences because the bona fide purchaser
had certain rights superior to those of the secured party." The bona
fide purchaser test had effectively eliminated the equitable lien theory
as a viable doctrine, for equitable liens could not meet that test be-
cause sale to a bona fide purchaser would normally cut off all outstand-
ing equities." As pointed out by Professor MacLachlan, the
bona fide purchaser test was not abandoned for the purpose
of validating equitable liens, but that consequence would pre-
sumably have followed if the subject had not been specifically
dealt with in [section 60(a) (6)] ."
Thus, the purpose of section 60(a) (6) was to provide the protection
against equitable liens, or at least some of the protection, available
under the bona fide purchaser test.' It was not meant to expand the
powers of the bankruptcy court. The bona fide purchaser test would
never have prevented the enforcement of equitable liens as between
two creditors of the bankrupt; it dealt merely with transfers made by
the bankrupt. There would thus seem to be no basis for arguing that
section 60(a) (6) now prevents the enforcement of agreements creating
87 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1964).
88 See H.R. Rep. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1949); 3 Collier, Bankruptcy
II 60.38 (14th ed. 1964).
80 3 Collier, supra note 88, 60.50; 46 Am. Jur. Sales § 464 (1943).
9° MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 307 (1956).
Di To a certain extent, the amendment gives equitable liens a more liberal treatment.
By virtue of the bona fide purchaser test all equitable liens were subject to some attack
by the bankruptcy trustee. The 1950 amendment placed a policy limitation on that
attack to those situations where there is a legal means of perfection. This was done
because the object of the drafters was to prevent the recurrence of the pre-I939 (pre-
bona-fide purchaser test) situation where courts were validating security interests con-
summated within four months of bankruptcy on the ground that the equitable right
was created before that period. This relation-back doctrine is discussed in the con-
gressional report accompanying the 1950 bill. H.R. Rep. No. 1293, supra note 88, at 4;
see generally Weinstein, The Bankruptcy Law of 1938, at 120 (1938) (comments to
section 60a). Mr. Weinstein was one of the principal drafters of the Chandler Act.
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equitable rights as between two creditors of the bankrupt. This section
becomes a real problem, however, upon the bankruptcy of the junior
creditor 92
In spite of the force of the above argument, the history of the
Bankruptcy Act in the courts does not permit one to completely ignore
the possibility of a different result.° Although it is possible for a
•court to find that equitable rights are created in other situations, this
risk would seem limited to subordination agreements which pre-Code
courts would have found to have created equitable assignments or
equitable liens. As pointed out above," these cases seemed limited to
subsequent subordination situations. Fortunately, if any subordination
agreement creates a security interest, it is probably this type which is
the easiest to perfect under the Code.
B. Insolvency of the Junior Creditor
If the obligor remains solvent and only the junior creditor becomes
bankrupt, no problem should arise in connection with the enforcement
of the subordination agreement. Since the subordination secures the
obligor's performance, the senior creditor will not incur any loss unless
the obligor defaults. Thus, in order for the senior creditor to be hurt,
there will have to be insolvency of both the obligor and the junior
creditor. In this situation the obligor's trustee should have no dif-
ficulty in determining that he will enforce the subordination agreement.
But if any security interest created by the subordination were not per-
fected, the subordinating creditor's trustee would argue that the un-
perfected security interest was invalid as to him by virtue of sections
9-301(1) (b) and 9-301(3) of the Code, and section 70(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.°6 And, if a security interest were in fact created but not
perfected, the trustee would probably win. If the double insolvency
occurs simultaneously, the junior creditor's trustee will claim the right
to payment under the subordinated note as a general creditor of the
obligor. If, on the other hand, the junior creditor becomes insolvent
before the obligor, the junior creditor's trustee may then attempt to
dispose of the note, free of the subordination, for the benefit of the
bankrupt's estate.
The real risk of loss for the senior creditor lies in a double bank-
92 See pt. III, § B infra.
93
 Cf., e.g., Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931) which according to Prof. MacLachlan,
who authored the sections the case interpreted, constitutes "one of the most glaring
misconstructions . . . in the history of Anglo-American law," MaeLachlan, supra note 90,
at 330; Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), overruled, Lewis v. Manufac-
turers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
94 See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
95
 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964) ; see note 34 supra and
accompanying text.
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ruptcy situation. Fortunately, double bankruptcy is more likely to
occur with a subsequent subordination, where the junior creditor is
often closely associated with the obligor. Of course, in extreme cases,
double bankruptcy could also be expected in an ab initio situation.
The point is, however, that the closer we get to the subsequent subordi-
nation, the greater is the likelihood that a security interest will be
held to have been created and the greater is the risk in failing to
perfect. However, the closer we get to the subsequent subordination,
the easier it becomes to perfect any security interest held to have been
created. Conversely, as we move toward the ab initio subordination,
there is less likelihood that a security interest has been created, it is
harder to perfect any security interest, and the risk in failing to per-
fect is smaller.
It has been noted that, outside the Code, courts have generally
enforced subordinations on the bankruptcy of the obligor, but there is
a paucity of cases involving the action of courts on the bankruptcy of
the junior creditor. However, a recent case not involving the Code, In
the Matter of Wyse," has raised numerous eyebrows and much blood
pressure.
In that case, the junior creditors not only subordinated present
and future debts of the obligor (a subsequent subordination) but also
agreed to guarantee the obligor's debts to the senior creditor. On the
bankruptcy of the obligor in Canada, the Canadian bankruptcy court
enforced the terms of the subordination agreement in distributing the
obligor's assets. Since the assets of the obligor were insufficient to
satisfy its debts to the senior creditor even with the subordination, the
senior creditor filed a proof of claim in the junior creditor's bank-
ruptcy proceeding in the United States for the difference, based on the
contract of guaranty. The United States court held that the senior
creditor had already been paid the junior creditor's share of the obli-
gor's assets and could receive nothing further as a general creditor until
all general creditors of the junior creditor had received a like portion
out of the latter's estate. The Canadian decision, said the court, was
not res judicata on the issue involved in the American bankruptcy.
According to the Sixth Circuit:
The guaranty contract was an unrecorded agreement, of which
none of Wyse's creditors had notice. Although it may have
been good between the parties, when Pioneer received the
dividend on Wyse's claim from the Canadian bankruptcy,
equity required subordination of Pioneer's claim filed in the
Wyse bankruptcy case, until the other unsecured creditors of
Wyse had received a like percentage of their claims. 97
1)8 340 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965).
e7 Id. at 724.
29
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The reference to the "unrecorded agreement" has led some in-
vestors to fear that the courts might hold subordinations invalid as
against the creditors of the junior creditor on the ground that they
create equitable interests unenforceable in such a bankruptcy." Even
if a bankruptcy court held that the subordination created an equitable
interest, however, it should enforce this interest where there is no
available legal means of perfection." If subordination agreements
create security interests under the Code, then the Code would seem to
provide a legal means of perfection. The failure to so perfect might
then be the basis for arguing that the subordination is unenforceable
on the bankruptcy of the junior creditor. While the Code, then, does
seem to provide a means of solving the problem raised in Wyse, if any
such problem actually exists, the failure to perfect under the Code in
the absence of an appropriate Code amendment would complicate the
Wyse problem. In any case, the fears raised by Wyse are perhaps
exaggerated. The Wyse case dealt with enforcement of a guaranty
agreement, the subordination having already been enforced in the prior
bankruptcy. When the Wyse court talked of an "unrecorded agree-
ment," it was referring to the guaranty agreement, although the sub-
ordination language was contained in that agreement.
The troublesome implication from the subordination standpoint
is that the recovery by the senior creditor of the junior creditor's share
under the subordination agreement upon the bankruptcy of the obligor
was an advance recovery under the guaranty agreement. It was a form
of preference, although the court did not use this term, over the other
99
 Mr. Calligar raised this question outside of the Code long before the decision In
the Matter of Wyse, supra note 96. See Calligar, supra note 74, at 395-96 where he
points out that there were numerous instances where bankruptcy courts have refused
to enforce equitable rights running in favor of third persons:
A subordination agreement does not constitute a present legal transfer, and in the
absence of such a transfer the subordinating creditor's trustee in bankruptcy
might be able to take title to the subordinated debt free and clear of all equitable
or contractual rights created by the subordination agreement . . . . The claim
of the trustee to the subordinated debt, as a lien creditor, might . be regarded
as superior to the unsecured right of the senior creditor. No cases have been
found involving the bankruptcy of the subordinator.
Ibid. He concluded that while it was not clear how much trouble the senior creditor
would have on the bankruptcy of the junior creditor, the question could be avoided
by including "a present assignment of the subordinated debt in the subordination agree-
ment," so that a "legal transfer . . . takes place on the date of the subordination
agreement"; thus the "senior creditor, as a prior assignee, would unquestionably prevail
over the trustee." It should be pointed out, however, that an assignment of certain rights
arising under the note would be just as present and legal an assignment as the assignment
of the entire subordinated debt. Also, the assignment suggested by Mr. Calligar would
clearly make the collateral "instruments" and require possession of the note for per-
fection under the Code. An important aspect of Mr. Calligar's comment is that it shows,
outside of the Code, how far from an assignment of the note the ordinary subordination
was considered to be by the leading authority on subordinations.
99 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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general creditors. Since the subordination language was found in the
guaranty agreement, the court combined the two and found it in-
equitable to allow the holder of the guaranty to obtain a greater
percentage than other general creditors. However, the subordination
agreement and the guaranty agreement were entirely different—one
dealing with obligations owed by the obligor to the junior creditor, and
the other creating a new obligation of the junior creditor to make good
the Obligor's debts to the senior creditor—and they should have been
treated as such.
The Wyse case would thus appear to be wrongly decided. Further,
it is clearly distinguishable from the normal subordination situation.'
This, however, will not prevent the junior creditor's trustee from using
the Wyse arguments in an attempt to prevent enforcement of the sub-
ordination. Thus the Code problem is not the only one facing the
lender. No doubt the Wyse question will be clarified by subsequent
court decisions; it is hoped that the Code problem will be clarified by
amendment.
IV. AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 9
Amendment of the Code is necessary. It should be clear by now
that Article 9 was never designed to deal with subordination agreements
and applies, if it applies at all, only by accident. How ironic it is to find
areas where the Code makes legitimate aspirations of the parties
difficult to achieve—and how far from Mr. Schnader's goal.
This article is not a condemnation of the Code, for there is no
question that the Code, and especially Article 9, represents one of
the greatest legal accomplishments in modern law. It stands as a
monument to the unselfish devotion of the numerous drafters who
spent significant portions of their lives in this cause. It is for this rea-
son that the Code should be corrected in any area where it does not
work, not only to enhance its reputation, but also to preserve support
for uniform legislation. 70'
100 Subordinations are usually not part of guaranty agreements and senior creditors
are not usually creditors of the junior creditor. The court, influenced by the coincidence
of the two agreements in one document, seemed to feel that all unsecured creditors
were not getting equal treatment. The court said: "One of the fundamental principles
of bankruptcy administration is equality among unsecured creditors." Supra note
96, at 724.
101 The drafters themselves have adverted to the necessity for amendment in certain
areas. See Section SEVENTH of the agreement dated August 5, 1961, between the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, as amended by Supplement dated August 5, 1961. In this section, the Editorial
Board stated as its policy the approval of a "minimum number" of amendments in
order to maintain uniformity. But the section goes on to say that "amendments shall
be approved" in four circumstances, including, when "it has been shown . . . that a
particular provision is unworkable or for any other reason obviously requires amend-
ment." That situation would certainly seem to exist in the case of g 9-104 with respect to
subordination agreements.
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There is no doubt that a serious problem exists with respect to
subordinations that places in jeopardy the future of such agreements
as financing devices. In this article, Mr. Calligar has been quoted as
comparing subordinations to chattel mortgages,'" Mr. Coogan as con-
sidering the possibility that at least subsequent subordinations create
security interests,'" Mr. Kripke as once suggesting a subordination
of accounts creates a security interest,' and Mr. Henson as finding a
security interest in the note itself in any subsequent subordination."'
Mr. Denonn's view is that there is danger that most subordinations
create security interests.'" As a result, it is difficult to obtain a
clear opinion from most law firms as to the enforceability of any
particular transaction involving subordinations. Of course, one can
not blame counsel. This is a new area; the statute is unclear; dangers
exist—they would be remiss if they failed to point these dangers out.
In the 1965 New York legislative session, Senator Jack E. Brons-
ton introduced a bill' at the behest of Mr. Lester Denonn and some
members of a committee of lawyers he formed for this purpose.'"
The Editorial Board and the New York Commission on Uniform State
Laws objected to the bill on the twin grounds that it was hastily
drafted' 0fl and would result in a disruption of the pattern of uniformity.
At a hearing on proposed Code amendments in Albany on May 4,
1965, sentiment favored postponing action on the proposed amendment
with respect to subordinations until the Editorial Board had an op-
portunity to propose uniform amendments in the fall. On the other
hand, there was support for the enactment of S. Intro. 3472 which would
1 °2 See note 16 supra,
1 °3 See note 30 supra.
104 See note 32 supra.
105 See note 44 supra.
108 See "Author's Comment," West's McKinney's Forms,
	 § 2050 (1965).
107
 Much credit must go to Senator Bronston for his interest in Code problems and
his willingness to sponsor corrective legislation. The Senator, after reading a talk delivered
by Mr. Denonn (N.Y.L.J. Feb. 18, 1965, p. 4, col. 1) wrote to Mr. Denonn suggesting
the preparation of some amendments to meet the problems pointed out by Mr. Denonn
which were troubling the New York financial community. It was Senator Bronston
who, on the request of certain institutional lenders, introduced S. Intro. 3472 which
dealt with the New York transition problem, and was passed by the legislature in the
1965 session. See p. 22 supra.
108 The "committee" met only once, on March 29, 1965, in Mr. Denonn's law
offices, although there were some letters and telephone communications between the
"members" prior to and after that date.
10° The provision dealing with subordinations, S. Intro. 4237 § 4, as finally intro-
duced, amended § 9-104 to provide that Article 9 would be inapplicable
to any interest or right created by debt subordination provisions or agreements
in or to payments or distributions which may be made in insolvency, bankruptcy
or other proceedings involving the estate of the person obligated on or with
respect to the subordinated debt, or any other payment of distribution on
or with respect thereto, whether or not such debt is expressly assigned by the one
subordinating the same.
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allow additional time for the filing of continuation statements with
respect to certain pre-Code security interests perfected originally with-
out filing. By this means it was felt that the subordination problem
could be avoided, at least as far as pre-Code interests were concerned,
until the Editorial Board could act. The coup de grace was probably the
reading of a letter from Mr. Schnader himself in which he promised,
inter alia:
As Chairman of the Permanent Editorial Board, I shall con-
vene the Board after the final action on the Code by the 1965
Legislatures. We shall then have before us all amendments
which have actually been made by Legislatures, as well as
any proposals which come to us from legislators, lawyers, or
any groups affected by the provisions of the Code. The Board
will review all these amendments and proposals and will, as
promptly as possible, make a report to the sponsors of the
Code for their approval.'"
As promised, a screening committee of the Editorial Board, consisting
of Mr. Homer Kripke and Professors Soia Mentschikoff and Robert
Braucher, are now meeting to consider the subordination problem and
other suggestions for amendment.
How, then, should the Code be amended? There are several pos-
sible alternatives. One, an amendment to section 1-201(37) to provide
that a subordination agreement does not create a security interest.
This, of course, determines the very nature of subordination agree-
ments and it must be clear that such a determination will do no violence
to the effectiveness of subordination agreements outside the Code. An-
other alternative lies in an amendment to section 9-302 to provide that
filing is not required to perfect a security interest created by a sub-
ordination agreement.' This is unsatisfactory, for it almost implies
that subordination security interests are perfected by possession.
Another suggestion is an amendment to section 9-304 to provide
that any security interest created by a subordination agreement is per-
fected without filing and without taking possession of the subordinated
paper. This might help solve the problem that may have been raised
by the Wyse case inasmuch as the senior creditor could argue that he
has a perfected security interest.' The problem here is that such an
amendment makes a determination of the nature of subordination agree-
ments and such a determination may raise more problems than it settles.
110
 Letter from William A. Schnader to Commissioner Alfred A. Buerger, New York
Commission on Uniform State Laws, April 22, 1965,
In This, in effect, was what the original draft of S. Intro. 4237 (N.Y. 1965),
introduced in the last session of the New York Legislature, provided. The bill was later
changed to amend NS. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-104.
112 See p. 29 supra.
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For example, if subordinations create security interests, will the taking
of subordinated debt by a corporation constitute a violation of negative
pledge clauses in the corporation's other financial transactions? Will
the taking of subordinated debt constitute a violation by institutional
lenders of provisions of state law which restrict to varying degrees the
right of such lenders to pledge their property as security? 113
Perhaps the most satisfactory alternative; then, is an amend-
ment to section 9-104 to provide that Article 9 is inapplicable to sub-
ordination agreements. This would cleanly resolve the Code problem,
and any other questions with respect to the validity of subordinations
would then be left to the courts or to special legislation. While not
attempting to write final language, the following is submitted as a tenta-
tive draft of such an amendment:
§ 9-104. This Article does not apply . . . (1) to a subordina-
tion by any secured or unsecured creditor of a right to pay-
ment from a debtor, whether or not such subordination is
effectuated by an assignment of such subordinating creditor's
right to payment from the debtor.
The reference to the use of assignment language does not mean that
an actual assignment of the note itself would be free from the Code
provisions. It is simply meant to cover the assignment of rights to
payment arising by virtue of the note, such as the assignment of rights
on bankruptcy of the obligor. Such assignment language is sometimes
implied or found in genuine subordinationsP The reference to a se-
cured creditor will help to clarify section 9-316 which permits sub-
ordinations by persons entitled to a priority, without stating whether
or not such subordinations create security interests. 115
It is suggested that the comment to this section be so worded as
to indicate that the amendment does not change the Code but merely
clarifies what always was the purport of the Code. Thus subordination
agreements executed prior to the amendment would be free from any
implication that the Code was applicable to them.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Code is not amended to correct the problems discussed
herein, the result may be to substantially curtail the use of subordina-
tion agreements as a tool to facilitate corporate financing.
The problem of the subordination agreement is a small one when
the "great uniform commercial code" is viewed as a whole. But it has
been a source of concern to institutional lenders and, if it were to cur-
115 E.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 78(2).
114 See p. 10 supra.
115 See p. 21 supra.
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tail the use of subordinations in future financing, it would also be a
source of concern to corporate borrowers. This problem, and the few
other small, but highly complex, unsolved Code problems, will un-
doubtedly be resolved in time by amendment and court decision. When
this comes to pass, the full promise of Mr. Schnader's words twenty-
five years ago will have been realized.'"
116 See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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